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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Due process is a concept of law that cannot be exactly defined, it is true, 15
but all authorities agree that there are at the very least two essential requirements. 16 These are notice and an opportunity to be heard. And, in determining whether these basic requirements have been met, the courts must look to
the substance of things and not to mere form.' 7 For as it was pointed out in
Mullane v. Central Hanover and Trust Company,18 "When notice is a person's
due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process." In fact, this Court felt
that the presumption that one knows the law falls short of being even the mere
gesture which was held to be insufficient in the Mullane case.
In its opinion, the Appellate Division also spoke of notice to persons other
than petitioner being sufficient to start the running of the thirty day period of
limitation within which she had to apply for review. This was not made a
requirement, however, for the Appellate Division did not state who these
persons might be. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon this
question. However, in Matter of Blewitt,19 (a petition to set aside a commission and proceedings in lunacy), the Court stated that if the presiding judge
was satisfied that notice to the alleged mentally ill person would be useless or
harmful to his health, notice to relatives in lieu of personal service would be
sufficient. Therefore, by analogy, it would seem that if notice to a relative or
friend of Mrs. Coates had been given, it probably would have been sufficient
to satisfy due process requirements. However, as was stated earlier, this was
not made a requirement and so the Court did not pass upon it. The precise
issue here was, (in view of the Appellate Division's construction of Section 76),
whether adequate notice had been given to this petitioner that the thirty day
period of limitation within which she had to make a demand for a jury trial
had commenced. And in view of the unrealistic proposition that someone in
petitioner's place should be presumed to know the law, the Court concluded that
nothing short of actual personal notice upon the petitioner would serve to
commence the running of the thirty day period of limitation after which she
would lose her right to demand a jury trial.
J. S. M.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VOUCHING IN AND IMPLEADER

At common law a defendant having a third party liable over to him could
vouch him into the litigation and bind him by the conclusiveness of the
judgment by giving him proper notice of the pendency of the suit.2 0 In
15. Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 191 (1878).
16. E.g., Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930); Inter Chemical Corp. v. Mirabelli,
269 App. Div. 224, 54 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1st Dep't 1945).
17. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230 (1900).
18. 339 U.S. 306 (1949).
19. 131 N.Y. 541, 30 N.E. 587 (1892).
20. See Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 144 N.Y. 663,
39 N.E. 360 (1895); The Village of Port Jervis v. The First National Bank of Port Jervis,
96 N.Y. 550 (1884); City of Rochester v. Montgomery, 72 N.Y. 65 (1878).
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addition to this doctrine the New York Civil Practice Act Section 193(2) provided a defendant the opportunity to implead a third party by filing a verified
third party complaint and proceeding as a third party plaintiff. 21 Since vouching in is but the common law counterpart of statutory impleader, it is seldom
invoked today, except in situations where a party seeking to implead a third
party cannot meet the requirements of the statute. In Glens Falls Insurance
Co. v.Wood,2 the plaintiff insurance company sought a summary judgment
in a subrogation action against the driver of an automobile on the grounds that
the defendant had been vouched into the original action against the insured
owner of the automobile by certain notices sent to him concerning the pendency
of the suit. In the prior litigation the present defendant's wife brought suit
for personal injuries against the owner'of the car in which she and her husband
were riding, the owner being the defendant's father. She recovered a judgment
against the father only, after he had refused to submit to the wishes of the
insurance company to implead the present defendant.
The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of vouching in had been
restricted to a named defendant who had offered control of the litigation to the
third party,23 and that neither the general co-operation nor subrogation clauses

of an insurance contract could confer the status of a named defendant on an
24
insurer.
Relying on the recent case of B'inchey v. Sellers,25 the plaintiff contended

that he was a party to the original action because of sufficient privity between
an insurer and its insured to permit the insurer to invoke the doctrine. However,
26
the Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court and- Appellate Division,
rejected this contention by pointing out that in the Hinchey case, not only did
the parties against whom the defense of collateral estoppel was invoked have
full opportunity to litigate, but they were also actual parties in the first action.
The Court's refusal to extend the doctrine of vouching in to the facts of
this case can be premised on the fact that the impleader statute, having been
enacted to control third party practice, is restricted to a named defendant.
It would seem that the Court of Appeals believes that the statute was intended
to do away with the old problems inherent in vouching in, namely, issues as to
the adequacy of the notice given, and the opportunity to defend.
It is apparent that this holding imposes a great hardship on the present
plaintiff, and does not avoid circuity of action and litigation. The trial court
indicated that corrective legislation might furnish the insurer with a remedy
21. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1923, ch. 250; The present impleader statute is N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act, Section 193-a(1).
22. 8 N.Y.2d 409, 208 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1950).
23. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. First National Bank, 281 N.Y. 162, 22
N.E.2d 324 (1939).
24. American Surety Co. of New York v. Diamond, 1 N.Y.2d 594, 153 N.Y.S.2d 918
(1956).
25.

7 N.Y.2d 287, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959).

26. 9 A.D.2d 201, 193 N.Y.S.2d 147 (3d Dep't 1959).
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in such cases where it tries unsuccessfully to implead and vouch in a third
party. The Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals suggested that the
plaintiff could have protected itself by inserting a clause in the insurance
contract giving the plaintiff the right to compel the insured to institute a third
party action.
M. A. L.
SERVICE OF SUBPOENA UPON FOREIGN CORPORATION UPHELD

The first question considered by the Court of Appeals in the case of La.
Belle Creole Inter., S.A. v. Attorney-General27 was whether a subpoena duces
tecum, served upon the petitioner-corporation, was unconstitutionally vague
and indefinite because it failed to show what matters were under investigation
by the Attorney General of New York State, or in what manner the documents
requested by the Attorney General were relevant and material to such
investigation. The petitioner-corporation's business consisted of the sale and
shipment of duty-free, imported liquor to citizens of the state. The Attorney
General, acting pursuant to his powers under the Executive Law to enjoin
repeatedly fraudulent or illegal acts committed in the conduct of business within
the state,28 attempted to use the subpoena to command the production of the
petitioner's corporate records for the past ten months at an inquiry into the
possibly fraudulent or illegal acts being committed in the course of petitioner's
business. The petitioner brought a proceeding to vacate the subpoena duces
tecum.
The subpoena duces tecum has long been a useful investigative tool in the
hands of law enforcement officials and, more recently, in the hands of
administrative bodies. 29 No question as to a violation of constitutional rights
against self-incrimination and unlawful search and seizure now remains in
New York when the subpoena is used for law enforcement purposes.30 One of
the more usual grounds for attack of the subpoena has been that it is too
burdensome and oppressive, but generally the courts have been quite liberal
in upholding the validity of the subpoena, even though the production of rather
extensive records has been requested by law enforcement officials.31 The
particular problem raised by the petitioner in the present case is that the
subpoena on its face failed to inform him of the purpose and subject matter
of the investigation, and the relevance the requested documents had to such
investigation.
The Court in the present case admitted that the more preferable practice
would have been for the Attorney General to show on the face of the subpoena
the relevancy of the documents to an inquiry which the Attorney General was
27.

10 N.Y.2d 192, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1961).

28.
29.
30.
31.

N.Y. Executive Law § 63 (12).
1 Davis, Administrative Law § 3.04 (1st ed. 1958).
Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N.Y. 423, 154 N.E. 289 (1926).
See, e.g., Manning v. Valente, 297 N.Y. 681, 77 N.E.2d 3 (1947); In re Edge

Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 176 N.E. 537 (1931).

92

